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Facade Easement: Inexpert
Valuation
By Wendy C. Gerzog
Dunlap1 involved facade easement transfers to
the National Architectural Trust (NAT), a qualified
charity that preserves building easements across the
country, although most are in New York City.2 In
Dunlap the Tax Court rejected the taxpayers’ ex-
perts’ evidence of the value of their facade ease-
ment and, consequently, denied the taxpayers’
claim of a charitable deduction. Although allowing
a deduction for their cash contributions to NAT to
enforce the easement and not finding any penalties
applicable, the Tax Court held that despite two
valuation reports written by accepted valuation
experts, the taxpayers had not established any
value for their easement.
The taxpayers, Loren and Nancy Dunlap, owned
one of the 31 units in the Cobblestone Loft Condo-
minium in Tribeca, Manhattan. The Cobblestone
bylaws require approval from the condominium
board to alter common areas. Andrews Building
Corp., which provides everyday management ser-
vices for Cobblestone, introduced NAT to the con-
dominium board. Daniel Reardon, an employee of a
company related to NAT, made a presentation to
the board about participation in the Federal Historic
Preservation Tax Incentives Program. NAT intro-
duced Steven McGrath, treasurer of the Cobble-
stone board, to a law firm that had previously
assisted NAT regarding facade easement donations.
The board hired the law firm to represent it, and
McGrath signed a waiver of any possible conflicts
arising from the firm’s representation of NAT and
Cobblestone.
Andrews Building Corp. distributed informa-
tional material to the unit owners, notifying them of
the law firm’s representation, and it stated that if
they granted NAT a facade easement, they ‘‘would
be entitled to a tax deduction of 10 percent to 15
percent of the value of the unit.’’3 Although the law
firm’s opinion letter to the board was dated ‘‘as of
December 31, 2003,’’ a footnote in the letter referred
to a document not released until July 2004. The
opinion letter was signed by the firm, but not by an
individual attorney, and was distributed to the
owners at an unknown date.
The board hired Miller Samuel to prepare an
appraisal for the facade easement donations. In
December 2003 the National Park Service declared
Cobblestone a certified historic structure for chari-
table contribution and conservation purposes in
accordance with the Tax Treatment Extension Act of
1980. The board approved, and McGrath executed,
the facade easement deed, which NAT accepted and
registered on December 29, 2003. The facade ease-
ment deed prevented the board from changing
Cobblestone’s facade without NAT’s express writ-
ten agreement, and it required that any changes
adhere to all pertinent government laws and regu-
lations.
The Miller Samuel appraisal of the facade ease-
ment, completed March 14, 2004, and supple-
mented on March 22, 2004, included statements
that:
• the valuation date was ‘‘as of’’ December 28,
2003;
1Dunlap v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-126, Doc 2012-
9303, 2012 TNT 85-5.
2Dunlap involved several cases with different taxpayers. For
the different taxpayers, it involved different numbers of years,
but the span of years at issue for any one of the taxpayers
covered a year or years from 2003 to 2005. Also, the government
made various concessions for several of the taxpayers. When
they filed their petitions in the Tax Court, most of the taxpayers
resided in New York; however, one individual lived in Nevada,
and one couple lived in Connecticut. 3Dunlap, T.C. Memo. 2012-126, at 8.
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• the easement’s value was approximately $8.2
million, or 12 percent of Cobblestone’s value,
based on before- and after-easement values;
• the cost and income valuation methods were
unreliable to value individual condominium
units; and
• the market data analysis method best reflected
market conditions.
The New York City Landmarks Preservation
Commission (LPC) — which designates local land-
marks and historic buildings — promulgates regu-
lations a little different from NAT’s, including
enforcement provisions. LPC staff investigate al-
leged violations of LPC regulations. Besides being
subject to the LPC as a historic property, Cobble-
stone is one of the few buildings with a ‘‘sound,
first-class condition’’ designation under LPC regu-
lations. As such, it is subject to a more stringent
preservation standard, which is applied in perpetu-
ity. Moreover, Cobblestone has a continuing main-
tenance agreement with the LPC to inspect its
property every five years.
To obtain a completed IRS Form 8283, ‘‘Noncash
Charitable Contributions,’’ which is required to
qualify for a facade easement donation deduction,
Cobblestone unit owners had to make cash contri-
butions to NAT equal to 7 percent of their indi-
vidual unit’s share of the easement donation for
NAT to monitor and enforce their facade easement.4
On their income tax returns prepared by a return
preparer at Faucett, Taylor & Associates LLP, the
taxpayers claimed a facade easement charitable
deduction of $237,000 ($126,670 in 2003 and a
carryover of the remaining amount for 2004) and a
cash charitable deduction for $16,588 paid to NAT
in 2004.5
The Tax Court considered three questions: (1)
whether the donated facade easement had any
value; (2) whether the cash payments to NAT were
contributions under section 170(c) or whether they
were nondeductible conditional gifts; and (3)
whether the taxpayers were liable for penalties
under section 6662(a) and (h).
Having found that the taxpayers retained the
burden of proof regarding the value of the facade
easement because they did not offer credible evi-
dence of its value, the court explained that courts
have adopted the ‘‘before and after’’ method to
determine the fair market value of restrictive ease-
ments, subtracting the after-easement value from
the property’s value before the easement’s restric-
tions. Citing Hilborn,6 the court explained how to
compute both the before and the after values. The
before value starts with the property’s highest and
best use value, which is determined by one of the
three accepted methods: capitalized net operating
income, replacement cost, and comparable sales.
The after value also begins with the property’s
highest and best use value after the easement is
attached. Then, the easement’s restrictions are com-
pared with existing zoning regulations and other
controls (such as local historic preservation ordi-
nances) to determine if, and how much, the ease-
ment impairs the use of the property at that time
and in the future.7
At trial, there was no testimony from anyone
from the law firm or from any of the taxpayers’ tax
return preparers. Although the government sub-
poenaed the return preparers, it did not have them
testify. The taxpayers and the government each
submitted two expert reports. All parties accepted
the four experts as qualified to value the facade
easement.
The court considered the parties’ expert reports
and testimony. Each of the expert’s appraisals used
the comparable sales method to determine the
before value. Because there were no sales of com-
parable condominiums subject to easement, the
after value was problematic. The government’s
experts concluded that the easement was valueless
because the restrictions of the easements were es-
sentially the same as those imposed by the LPC;
Cobblestone’s bylaws required board approval for
any facade alterations; sales of encumbered units
produced substantially appreciated prices; and bro-
kers indicated that the easement did not adversely
affect a unit’s sale.
One of the taxpayers’ experts, Marilyn Weitz-
man, used the income approach to determine the
after value. To apply this method, she calculated a
before value based on the assumption that Cobble-
stone was rental property and then estimated rental
revenue for each unit, for each parking space, and
for revenue gained from advertisements on its
facade. She also estimated expenses and reached a
before value of approximately $34.1 million. Then,
4The actual amounts expended by NAT for monitoring and
enforcing the facade easements from 2001 to 2007 were small
relative to the cash contributions to NAT, and NAT did not
begin to monitor Cobblestone until 2006. Each of the taxpayers
in this consolidated case had made varying cash contributions
to NAT; the government disallowed only three of the couples’
cash contributions, including the Dunlaps’.
5Neil Faucett was Nancy Dunlap’s accountant for more than
20 years, and she forwarded to him all of the facade easement
information she had received. The remaining taxpayers’ par-
ticular facade easement and cash deductions are detailed in
Dunlap, T.C. Memo. 2012-126, at 25-31.
6Hilborn v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 677 (1985).
7Dunlap, T.C. Memo. 2012-126, at 35-36, citing Hilborn, 85 T.C.
at 689-690.
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Weitzman valued the after value, eliminating in-
come from facade advertising and increasing some
expenses as well as raising the capitalization rate
from 5.75 to 6.35 percent. With those adjustments,
she valued the after easement at nearly $28.8 mil-
lion, an approximate reduction of 15.5 percent.
The taxpayers’ other expert, Michael Ehrmann,
used a comparable sales approach to assess the after
value but discounted sales from different years back
to a consistent date. He testified that he used in part
the discounted cash flow approach, ‘‘which
straddles the fence between the comparable sales
approach and the income capitalization approach.’’8
Ehrmann compared Cobblestone unit sales with
and without attached easements from 2004-2009.
Although recognizing that discounting primarily is
applied when valuing anticipated revenue, he then
discounted those sales to December 29, 2003, the
appraisal date. He could not find discount rates
applicable to residential condominiums, but he
used the average discount rate for multifamily
rental housing (9.19 percent), raising that rate to 10
percent on the basis that residential real estate
condominiums were riskier investments. Applying
that rate to the sales from 2004-2009, he determined
that the discounted value of comparable sales was
16.45 percent higher than that of Cobblestone unit
sales. Ehrmann then adjusted the 16.45 percent
figure and ultimately found a diminution rate of 10
percent from the before-easement value.
One of the government’s experts criticized Ehr-
mann’s use of discounting as effecting a great
distortion in his sales figures, arguing that there
was no reason to employ discounting, which to his
knowledge had never been used in this context. He
concluded that Ehrmann’s method had resulted in a
‘‘mathematical skewing of the resale data’’ and that
no proper sales comparison had been done.9
Finding that the taxpayers’ appraisal report
values lacked credibility, the court refused to give
them any probative weight. That the valuation of
Cobblestone as a rental building was about half that
of its actual use as a condominium should have
informed Weitzman that ‘‘she was not using a
constant ‘highest and best use’ across her valua-
tion.’’10 The court found distortions in her treatment
of one-time expenses like insurance, and despite her
belief that the NAT easements were more restrictive
than those the LPC imposed, it also found that the
restrictions placed by NAT were about the same as
those limited by LPC. The taxpayers argued that
NAT provided an increased enforcement effort;
however, Ehrmann, one of the taxpayers’ own ex-
perts, stated that LPC required inspections of both
Cobblestone’s interior and exterior to remain ‘‘in a
sound, first-class condition.’’11 Cobblestone was not
part of NAT’s easement monitoring until 2006, and
NAT’s financial reporting indicated little monitor-
ing and enforcement expenses.
Finally, finding distortions in Ehrmann’s dis-
counting method and no acceptable comparative
sales data, the court rejected his appraisal report,
saying it incorporated ‘‘an undersampling of sales
in the best real estate year (2007) and an
oversampling of sales in the worst real estate year
(2009).’’12 The court found a 7.89 percent spread in
sales value, which it reduced by Ehrmann’s
adjustments and Cobblestone’s agreement with the
LPC to a 3 percent spread between the Cobblestone
unit sale prices and comparable condominium sale
prices, and the court found that difference insignifi-
cant.
Siding with the taxpayers on the two remaining
issues, the court held that the cash payments to
NAT were charitable contributions and were not
conditional gifts. Citing its decision in Kaufman,13
the court held that the benefits from NAT enabled
the taxpayers to make the charitable contribution.
Further, the court found that any benefits the tax-
payers received from NAT in return for their cash
contributions were incidental and insignificant. Be-
cause the court found no evidence indicating that
any of the taxpayers’ cash contributions would be
refunded to them on a subsequent appraisal with a
lower easement value, the court rejected the gov-
ernment’s argument that the taxpayers had made a
conditional gift.
Finally, the court rejected the government’s ap-
plication of the accuracy-related penalties under
section 6662(b)(3) and (e) (for valuation misstate-
ment) or (h) to the court’s disallowance of the
facade easement charitable deductions. The court
refused to make unfavorable inferences from the
fact that the taxpayers did not call as a witness
anyone from the law firm who prepared an opinion
letter on the donation of their easement to NAT or
anyone from their tax return preparer’s firm be-
cause the government also did not call them to
testify. Asserting other facts such as the taxpayers’
disclosure on their tax returns, their substantial
compliance with Form 8283, and the taxpayers’
reasonable reliance on the Miller Samuel appraisal,
8Dunlap, T.C. Memo. 2012-126, at 41.
9Id. at 46.
10Id. at 48.
11Id. at 50.
12Id. at 54.
13Kaufman v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294, 318-319 (2011), Doc
2011-7123, 2011 TNT 65-17. See Wendy C. Gerzog, ‘‘Mortgages
and Conservation Easements: Not a Good Mix,’’ Tax Notes, July
25, 2011, p. 437, Doc 2011-14025, or 2011 TNT 145-10.
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the court found that the taxpayers had acted rea-
sonably and in good faith. Also, the court found
that the taxpayers met the reasonable cause defense
of section 6664(c) because their easement value was
based on a ‘‘qualified appraisal’’ by a ‘‘qualified
appraiser’’ and they had made a good-faith inquiry
about the easement’s value.14
Boltar
In Boltar,15 the taxpayer’s expert’s report lacked
before- and after-easement and contiguous-parcel
values, in contravention of the regulations’ require-
ments. The report calculations also used
prohibitive-use values. Citing Daubert16 and Federal
Rules of Evidence Rule 702, the Boltar court ex-
cluded the taxpayer’s expert’s report, stating that
the report was ‘‘too speculative and unreliable to be
useful’’17 and that its factual mistakes showed ‘‘the
lack of sanity in their result.’’18
Hilborn
The sole issue in Hilborn was the FMV of a facade
servitude that the taxpayers, indirectly as limited
partners, had donated to the New Orleans Vieux
Carré Commission (VCC).19 In the course of its
negotiations with the VCC, the partnership had
agreed to rehabilitate the building, beyond facade
repairs, for not more than $185,000, although it
ultimately paid more than $55,000 above that
amount. Moreover, the partnership had to pay
$47,780 for outside repairs and rehabilitation on the
buildings. Because there was no established market
for valuing the easement, the parties agreed that its
value would be the difference between the property
without, and then with, the easement.20
Rejecting all four of the approaches, the tax-
payers’ expert concluded that his subjective judg-
ment was the only way to determine the after value.
He stated that the easement resulted in ‘‘substantial
additional burdens’’ such as precluding grouping
with the neighboring corner lot and incurring ad-
ditional administrative difficulties in making VCC’s
required rehabilitations.21 He calculated a 12 per-
cent diminution of property value, or $46,000, plus
the additional $48,000 burden placed on the ease-
ment, resulting in a total easement value of $94,000.
The government’s expert applied four ap-
proaches and determined the easement’s value to
be $24,500. He confirmed the 10 percent value loss
by market values of easement-encumbered proper-
ties in New Orleans, although there were only three
such sales. Two had no loss in value and the third
had a 9 percent diminution. Also, he valued the
easement by accounting for renovations to the
property after the donation, excluding land value,
and assessed the easement at $53,500.
Both parties’ experts applied the before-and-after
approach, both used market data to calculate the
before value, and both looked at the servitude
agreement to determine its impact on the after
value. The court considered the government’s 10
percent diminution more reasonable, but it made
adjustments incorporating some points of each par-
ty’s report.
Kaufman
Like Dunlap, Kaufman involved a facade ease-
ment and an accompanying cash donation to NAT.
The question addressed regarding the facade ease-
ment, however, was a reconsideration22 of whether
the taxpayer’s easement satisfied the ‘‘enforceability
14Dunlap, T.C. Memo. 2012-126, at 89.
15Boltar LLC v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 326 (2011), Doc 2011-
7257, 2011 TNT 66-10. See Gerzog, ‘‘Excluding Expert Valuation
Testimony,’’ Tax Notes, Sept. 26, 2011, p. 1423, Doc 2011-18464, or
2011 TNT 188-8.
16Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
17Boltar, 136 T.C. at 339.
18Id.
19On December 28, 1979, the partnership granted a servitude
in perpetuity under Louisiana law, which the court described as
essentially a common-law easement in perpetuity.
20The taxpayers’ expert valued the gift at $94,000, and at
$108,400. On brief, the taxpayers asserted a value of $108,400,
rather than their expert’s figure $94,000, to include $20,000 of
indirect acquisition costs allowed by the government’s expert
but not accounted for by their own expert. The government’s
expert determined a value of $24,500. The court explained:
‘‘Before’’ value (Before Value) is arrived at by first deter-
mining the highest and best use of the property in its
current condition unrestricted by the easement. At this
stage the suitability of the property’s current use under
existing zoning and market conditions and realistic alter-
native uses are examined. Any suggested use higher than
current use requires both ‘‘closeness in time’’ and ‘‘rea-
sonable probability.’’ Next, to the extent possible, the
three commonly recognized methods of valuing property
(capitalized net operating income, replacement cost and
comparable sales) are used, but are modified to take into
account any peculiarities of the property which impact on
the relative weight to be afforded each respective method.
‘‘After’’ value (After Value) is arrived at by first deter-
mining the highest and best use of the property as
encumbered by the easement. At this stage the easement’s
terms and covenants are examined, individually and
collectively, and compared to existing zoning regulations
and other controls (such as local historic preservation
ordinances) to estimate whether, and the extent to which,
the easement will affect current and alternate future uses
of the property. Next, the above-mentioned three ap-
proaches to valuing property are again utilized to esti-
mate the value of the property as encumbered by the
easement.
Hilborn, 85 T.C. at 689-690.
21Id. at 691.
22In Kaufman, the court reviewed its earlier grant of partial
summary judgment for the government in Kaufman v. Commis-
sioner, 134 T.C. 182 (2010), Doc 2010-9252, 2010 TNT 80-12.
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in perpetuity’’ regulatory requirements.23 Accord-
ing to the regulations, the charity must receive an
absolute, immediate, vested right to insurance pro-
ceeds following a judicial extinguishment of the
easement.
The court held that because the taxpayer’s agree-
ment with NAT did not provide NAT with that
right, NAT should not receive its share of the
proceeds. Further, the court rejected the taxpayers’
argument that the risk and events fell under the
regulation’s remote and negligible exception.
The court held that the government had the
burden of proving that the taxpayer’s cash contri-
bution lacked donative intent and constituted quid
pro quo for NAT’s helping the taxpayer obtain a tax
deduction, and that the government did not sustain
its burden. Neither party cited specific case law
precedent for its argument. Also, the evidence was
ambiguous; the government had not submitted
evidence of the value of the taxpayers’ benefit.
According to the court, the cash payment assisted
the taxpayers solely in obtaining a charitable deduc-
tion. The payments ultimately enabled the charity
to fulfill its charitable purpose.
Analysis and Conclusion
Dunlap did not present as extreme a situation as
the one in Boltar. However, the Dunlap court did
find that both of the taxpayers’ experts’ reports
lacked credibility and thus had no probative value.
Although the court held that the reports addressed
the property’s before- and after-easement values, it
found they did not properly calculate its after-
easement value. The experts computed that value
with multiple distortions and without acceptable
comparable sales figures. They also did not explain
how the NAT easements were more restrictive than
those imposed by the LPC.
To provide an effective report, the expert must
employ an acceptable method as defined in the
regulations and provide data that reasonably ex-
plain the diminution in value caused by the impo-
sition of additional limitations effected by the
easement. Fancy footwork will not convince the
court that the taxpayers deserve a charitable contri-
bution deduction.
23See reg. section 1.170A-14(g)(6).
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